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FRANCHISES: STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW




Franchising is a method of distributing goods and services; it is not
itself a product, service, or industry. The core of all franchising is the
licensing of a brand name, trademark, product, or method of service.
Three distinct types of franchises are generally recognized: (1) distribu-
tion of the franchisor's product, such as automobiles, gasoline, and elec-
trical applicances; (2) retail outlets that follow a common format, such as
those found in the fast food industry, restaurant field, and in motel opera-
tions; and (3) manufacturing or processing plants involving a formula or
method with specifications provided by the franchisor, such as the bottling
of soft drinks, and mattress and bedding manufacturing.1 The type of
franchise may be important in determining if a particular business prac-
tice is unlawful under federal and state laws. 2
Franchisors and franchisees are independent businessmen operating
under contractual agreements. The franchise agreement establishes a set
of restraints under which the franchisee operates the franchised business.
One purpose of these restraints is to ensure the success of the enterprise
by requiring that a proven pattern of doing business is followed. Another
purpose is to satisfy the requirements of the Lanham Act3 which protects
trademarks and trade names of the franchisor only if there is adequate con-
trol over the use of the trademark to ensure minimum standards of
quality or uniformity.4
For the most part, disputes between franchisors and franchisees arise
out of the restraints, practices, and controls imposed by the franchisor
on the franchised operation. This article will identify and examine the
0© 1980, The Missouri Bar, all rights reserved. This article was prepared
for The Missouri Bar and is reproduced with its permission.
**Director and shareholder, Shughart, Thomson & Kilroy, P.C., Kansas City,
Missouri; B.A., University of Missouri-Columbia, 1967; J.D., University of Mis-
souri-Columbia, 1970.
***Partner, Shook, Hardy 8 Bacon, Kansas City, Missouri; B.S., University of
Missouri-Columbia, 1967; J.D., University of Missouri-Columbia, 1970.
1. J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 646-47 (1973).
2. The type of franchise may affect such factors as the permissible scope of
a covenant not to compete, Zeidman, The Rule of Reason in Franchisor-Fran-
chisee Relationships, 47 ANTITRUST L.J. 873, 885-86 (1978); the applicability of
particular statutes such as the Automobile Dealer's Day in Court Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1221-1225 (1976); or to what extent the franchisor may require the franchisee
to stock or carry the franchisor's products, Miller Motor, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.,
149 F. Supp. 790, 808 (M.D.N.C. 1957), aff'd, 252 F.2d 441 (4th Cir. 1958).
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1976).
4. Id. § 1052.
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FRANCHISE ACTIONS IN MISSO URI
various causes of action which are available to the franchisee to challenge
the controls embodied in the franchise agreement.
II. ACTIONS UNDER THE FEDERAL
AND MISSOURI ANTITRUST LAWS
A. Antitrust Principles
The discussion in this section of the causes of action applicable to
franchising assumes that the reader has a basic knowledge of antitrust
laws and theories.5 This includes an understanding of such concepts
as the so-called "right not to do business," "combination," "per se viola-
tions," "rule of reason," "intrabrand and interbrand competition," and
"vertical and horizontal restraints." The interplay of these concepts is
involved in most antitrust violations and is particularly relevant to fran-
chising disputes.
The Missouri as well as federal antitrust laws may be applicable to
franchising practices occurring in the state. Missouri's antitrust statutes fol-
low closely the wording of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act6 and sec-
tion 3 of the Clayton Act.1 Because Missouri provides by statute that
judicial interpretation of the federal acts will be precedent for the com-
parable state laws,8 the state and federal statutes need not be treated
separately.
The franchisor-imposed restraints that are most commonly litigated under
the antitrust laws include restrictions on: (1) customers to whom fran-
chisees may sell; (2) territories in which a franchisee may do business; (3)
resale prices to be charged by franchisees; (4) types of goods a franchisee
may sell; and (5) sources from which raw materials may be purchased. Also
challengeable under the antitrust laws are a franchisor's refusal to deal
or refusal to continue to deal when the refusal is an attempt to force a
prospective or existing franchisee to join in an illegal course of action.
B. Pricing Restrictions
Any attempt by a franchisor to control the price at which a franchisee
resells goods or services is prohibited.9 This includes the full range of pro-
scribed price-setting devices: compulsory bargains, discounts, and maximum
or minimum prices. 10 The courts have vigorously condemned price-setting,
5. For a general discussion of antitrust law, see L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST
(1977).
6. Compare 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976) with RSMo § 416.031-1 to -2 (1978).
7. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1976) with RSMo § 416.031-3 (1978).
8. RSMo § 416.141 (1978).
9. See Capital Temporaries of Hartford, Inc. v. Olsten Corp., 383 F. Supp.
902 (D. Conn. 1974); Mid-America ICEE, Inc. v. John E. Mitchell Co., 1973-2
Trade Cas. f 74,681 (D. Or. 1973).
10. Albrecht v. Harold Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); United States v. Parke,
Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons,
Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951); Adolph Coors Co. v. FTC, 497 F.2d 1178 (10th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975).
1980]
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no matter how ingeniously disguised, as per se violations of section 1 of
the Sherman Act. On the other hand, unilateral action by franchisors in
setting prices is not unlawful." Practices of a franchisor such as "suggest-
ing" or "recommending" a resale price, preticketing the resale item, and
price advertising may be acceptable if other coercive circumstances are not
present.12
Franchisors are prohibited only from coercing franchisees to .set a
price. Coercion may be shown from such factors as the entire relationship
between the parties, the irrelative economic power, the use of short term
agreements, and other restrictions in the franchising arrangement. 13 Co-
ercion exists where the franchisor's conduct injures interstate commerce' 4
by depriving franchisees of free judgment to establish prices.' 5 A franchisor
may not threaten to terminate or to withdraw benefits from a franchisee
in order to force compliance with its pricing policy.' 6 If franchisors operate
businesses at the level of their franchisees and are in competition with
them, use of company owned stores to set prices may be viewed as a direc-
tive from the franchisor to the franchisee to sell at the company store
price and would constitute illegal price-fixing.' 7
Advertising also can be construed as a pricing violation. For example,
advertising practices are illegal if they have the effect of encouraging
franchisees to police discounting by other franchisees or if they discourage
price competition among franchisees.' 8 If the practice only indirectly af-
fects prices, courts are likely to apply a rule of reason test to determine
its validity.' 9 Once price-fixing has been found, however, there is a per
se violation of the antitrust statute and defenses are limited. The reason-
11. See United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967); United States v.
Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944); United States v. Colgate & Co.,
250 U.S. 300 (1919).
12. Evans v. S.S. Kresge Co., 544 F.2d 1184 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433
U.S. 908 (1977); Chisholm Bros. Farm Equip. Co. v. International Harv. Co., 498
F.2d 1137 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1023 (1974); United States v. O.M.
Scott & Sons Co., 303 F. Supp. 141 (D.D.C. 1969).
13. Zeidman, supra note 2, at 883.
14. An effect on interstate commerce is a jurisdictional prerequisite to the
federal cause of action. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
15. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964); Cooper Liquor, Inc. v.
Adolph Coors Co., 506 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1975).
16. Greene v. General Foods Corp., 517 F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 942 (1976); Phillips v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 395 F. 'Supp.
735 (D. Md. 1975), vacated on other grounds, 556 F.2d 702 (4th Cir. 1977).
17. See Rea v. Ford Motor Co., 497 F.2d 577 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 868 (1974); Mount Lebanon Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 283 F. Supp. 453
(W.D. Pa. 1968), affd, 417 F.2d 622 (3d Cir. 1969).
18. Mt. Vernon Sundat, Inc. v. Nissan Motor Corp., 1976-1 Trade, Cas.
60,842 (E.D. Va. 1975).
19. See Denison Mattress Factory v. Spring-Air Co., 308 F.2d 403 (5ih Cir.
1962); Weight Watchers of the Rocky Mountain Region, Inc. v. Weight Watchers
Int'l, Inc., 1976-2 Trade Cas. ff 61,157 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
[V1ol." 45
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ableness of the price fixed is no defense; 20 the fair trade exemption which
formerly acted as a shield against some vertical price-fixing has now been
repealed,21 and the so-called "passing-on" defense which might bar the
franchisee from suit if he "passes-on" overcharges to his customers is
limited.22
C. Tying and Exclusive Supply Arrangements
Restrictions requiring a franchisee to purchase certain goods from
its franchisor may involve a possible illegal tying arrangement under sec-
tion 3 of the Clayton Act and section 1 of the Sherman Act.23 Simply de-
fined, a tying arrangement exists where there are two products and the
acquisition of the economically desirable product (tying item) is made
conditional upon the purchase of the second product (tied item). 24 A
per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act results if there are separate
tying and tied products and the franchisor has sufficient economic power in
the "tying product" to restrain a not insubstantial amount of competition
in the "tied product."2 5
Often the central issue of a tying claim in franchising cases is whether
franchises or trademarks are separate products from the products sold un-
der the trademarks. Most courts hold that a distributor franchise such as
an automobile dealership is not a separate product from the actual line
of automobiles sold by the dealer.2 6 Store franchises such as fast food
restaurants, on the other hand, have been held in some cases to be separate
products in their own right and to serve as tying items in tying arrange-
ments.27 Other cases have not followed this rule and have held that the
trademarks of the stores identified the origin of the products sold and
were not themselves separate items. 28 Factors to consider in determining
whether a trademark is a separate product are whether the purchase price
20. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
21. Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801,
amending 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1975).
22. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968);
Phillips v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 426 F. Supp. 1156 (D. Md. 1977).
23. See, e.g., Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc, 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972). The Federal Trade Commission Act may also
be applicable. FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 393 U.S. 223 (1968); Atlantic Ref. Co. v.
FTC, 382 U.S. 357 (1965).
24. Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 955 (1972).
25. United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc., 429 U.S. 610 (1977).
26. See, e.g., Hammond Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 39 F.R.D. 604 (S.D.N.Y.
1966). See generally 1 J. GrLsoN, TRADEMARK PROTECrION AND PRACES § 6.02
(1974).
27. Carpa, Inc. v. Ward Foods, Inc., 536 F.2d 39 (5th Cir. 1976) (trade-
mark "Zuider Zee" held a tying product where franchisor had a total of six
franchises, two of which belonged to the complaining franchisees).
28. Capital Temporaries, Inc. v. Olsten Corp., 506 F.2d 658 (2d Cir. 1974);
Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 1979-2 Trade Cas. . 62,806 (C.D. Cal.
1979); Esposito v. Mr. Softee, Inc., 1976-1 Trade Cas. ff 60,786 (E.D.N.Y. 1976);Q-T. Markets, Inc. v. Fleming Cos., 394 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Colo. 1975).
1980]
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for the franchise includes a separate charge for the trademark and whether
the trademark identifies the product sold under the mark or is simply
the form used to market the product.
To prove sufficient economic power, the second element of a tying
arrangement proscribed under section 1 of the Sherman Act, the courts
require proof that the tying product was used "coercively." Coercion is
often presumed when the franchise agreement requires the purchase of
the tied product.29 Where the contract does not provide for tying, coer-
cion may be proven from a course of conduct showing that the franchisee
was "coerced" into purchasing the tied item.3 0 The uniqueness of a prod-
uct is not enough to establish coercion.31 There also must be a showing
that the tying product gives the franchisor some advantage not shared
by his competitors in the market for the tying product.3 2
In considering the sufficiency of economic power in the context of
franchising, a few courts have presumed that economic power is inherent
in the trademark.33 Most court decisions, however, do not recognize any
presumption of power from the trademark itself.34
The final requirement for a per se violation of the Sherman Act
through an illegal tying agreement is the foreclosure of a not insubstantial
amount of commerce to competitors. This requirement is shown if the
totality of tied sales, not merely sales to the particular plaintiff, amount
to a not insubstantial amount of money. Approximately $60,000 has been
held to be an amount sufficient to meet this commerce requirement.35
Although the test is normally satisfied when tying arrangements are adopted
by a sizeable company, franchisees have not always been able to meet the
test's requirements. 3 6
To avoid liability through the use of express tying agreements, many
franchisors exercise quality control by confining their franchisees to the
use of products or services obtained from "approved sources of supply,"
which sometimes includes the franchisor. Courts generally have considered
these restrictions under the rule of reason standard.3 7 Approval of alternate
sources probably will be valid if the franchisor specifies that its approval
of alternate sources will not unreasonably be withheld and it in fact
29. Smith v. Denny's Restaurants, Inc., 62 F.R.D. 459 (N.D. Cal. 1974);
Abercrombie v. Lum's, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 387 (S.D. Fla. 1972).
30. Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 78 F.R.D. 108 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
31. Plastic Contact Lens Co. v. Frontier of Northeast, Inc., 441 F.2d 67
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 881 (1971).
32. United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc., 429 U.S. 610 (1977).
33. Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 955 (1972).
34. Capital Temporaries, Inc. v. Olsten Corp., 506 F.2d 658 (2d Cir. 1974).
35. United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
36. Evans v. S.S. Kresge Co., 544 F.2d 1184 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433
U.S. 908 (1977).
37. Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d
368 (5th Cir. 1977).
[Vol. 45
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applies that standard. However, the franchisor may not require the use of
supplies bearing its trademark.38
Two defenses are recognized to a claim that a tying arrangement is
per se illegal: the quality control defense and the new business defense.
Both are based on the franchisor's right to protect the good will of his
business. The quality control defense is available only if there are no sub-
stitutes equal in quality to the tied product or. if it is impractical or im-
possible to submit detailed instructions for the manufacture of the tied
product to other suppliers.3 9 This defense is consistent with the franchi-
sor's obligations under the Lanham Act to ensure that inferior products
do not reach the public under its trademark.40 The new business defense
requires proof that tying arrangements are necessary to the development
of the goodwill of the franchise during the initial stages of the franchise
business.41 Although there are few guidelines as to when a business is no
longer new, it is settled that once a franchise business is established, the
defense is no longer available. 42
D. Territorial and Customer Restrictions
In 1977 the Supreme Court in Continental T.V., Inc. v. G.T.E. Syl-
vania, Inc.,43 overruled the per se rule of the illegality of vertical territorial
Customer restrictions and held that such restrictions are to be judged by
the rule of reason test. The impact of the Sylvaznia decision on franchising
is iot yet clear. Under the guidelines set out in the Sylvania decision, it
is likely that courts will uphold vertically imposed territorial and cus-
tomer restrictions if they do not unreasonably restrain interbrand compe-
tition.
Territorial limitations specify the geographical area in which a fran-
chisee may do business. Customer limitations usually define the classes of
customers to whom a franchisee cannot sell. There is no limit to the
variety of these types of restrictions in the franchise setting.
Some franchise agreements provide for location clauses which estab-
lish the physical site of the franchisee's place of business or require the
franchisor's consent for any change of location or creation of any branch
office. Related restrictions are variously referred to as exclusive distribu-
torships, exclusive franchisees, exclusive representation, or exclusive agency.
These restrictions limit the franchisor's freedom to enter into competitive
38. H. BRowN, FRANCiISING REALITIES AND RI Y.iEs 168-74 (1973).
39.. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1948); IBM Corp. v.
United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936); Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir.),
cert. granted, 379 U.S. 885 (1964), cert. dismissed, 381 U.S. 125 (1965).
40. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1055, 1064 (e) (1) (1976).
41. United States v. Jerrold Elec. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960),
aff'd, 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
42. Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Cal. 1970),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955
(1972).
43. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
1980]
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franchise agreements with other franchisees in a particular territory.
Even though competition between franchisees is reduced by these restric-
tions, they may pass muster because competition between different brands
of the same product or service is increased.44
Franchisors also have used "primary area of responsibility" and
"quota" clauses to ensure that each territory for which an exclusive fran-
chise is granted receives maximum distribution coverage. Under an area
of responsibility clause, a franchisee is required to use its best efforts to
develop sales in its assigned territory. The quota clause requires the
franchisee to sell a specified amount of the franchisor's product. Normally,
such clauses do not prohibit franchisees from making sales outside of their
primary area and other franchisees may sell within that area. These clauses
are probably lawful so long as they are reasonable in scope and are not
designed as a subterfuge to preclude competition.4 5
Franchisees who fail to meet obligations under these clauses often
suffer penalties ranging from forfeiture of profits made on unauthorized
transactions to loss of their franchises. The area of responsibility clause
typically includes a profit-passover requirement. That requirement usually
provides that a franchisee who makes sales to customers outside of its as-
signed territory must forfeit part of its profit to the franchisee in whose
territory the customer is situated. Although courts have approved these
arrangements in cases where a distributor must, under a compulsory
warranty program, service a product sold by another distributor,46 the
lawfulness of these penalties in the framework of a franchising system will
depend on their effect on competition in each particular circumstance.4 7
E. Unilateral versus Concerted Refusals to Deal
A franchisor may decide not to deal either at the beginning or during
the course of the franchise relationship. The franchisor's unilateral de-
cision not to deal, to terminate, or not to renew a franchise is permitted
by the antitrust laws if that decision has no unreasonable and adverse ef-
fect on competition. 48 Franchisors may decide independently to refuse to
grant franchisees new applications even if the underlying reason for the
refusal is to protect existing outlets from new competition or to create an
exclusive distributorship.49 In any event, refusals to deal that are part of
a program to fix prices at which franchisees may resell goods or services are
44. See, e.g., Salco Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 517 F.2d 567 (10th Cir.
1975).
45. Fontana Aviation, Inc. v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 432 F.2d 1080 (7th Gir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 928 (1971).
46. Eiberger v. Sony Corp. of America, 459 F. Supp. 1276 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
47. See generally Zeidman, supra note 2, at 888-90.
48. United States v. Otter Tail Power Co., 331 F. Supp. 54 (D. Minn. 1971).
49. Burdett Sound, Inc. v. Altec Corp., 515 F.2d 1245 (5th Cir. 1975); Fore-
most-McKesson, Inc. v. American Hosp. Supply Corp., 1974-2 Trade Cas. ff 75,447
(S.D. Tex. 1974), aff'd, 527 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1976).
[Vol.' 45
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prohibited.: 0 Further, concerted refusals to deal by two or more persons
are classified as boycotts which courts have held to have no legitimate or
reasonable business justification.5 ' A refusal to deal based on an agree-
ment between the franchisor and one or more of its franchisees not to grant
new franchises is a per se violation of section I of the Sherman Act:5 2
Concerted actions to drive a franchisee out of business are likewise un-
lawful.53
F. Laws Prohibiting Monopoly
Antitrust laws prohibit "monopolization," "attempts to monopolize,"
and "combination and conspiracy to monopolize."' 54 Because of prevalent
misconceptions regarding monopolies, little attention has been paid to
this antitrust prohibition. Monopoly is not confined to the multi-million
dollar industries, and "attempted monopoly" may be found in almost
every product or geographic market. The prohibitions against monopoly
have been applied to a number of cases involving franchises.55
In many franchising systems, the incidence of the franchisor compet-
ing with franchisees and terminating or not renewing franchises is spread-
ing.56 The increasing presence of the franchisor at its franchisees' market
level undoubtedly will result in more monopolization suits. Franchisors
who compete with their franchisees and engage in predatory conduct run
the risk of violating section 2 of the Sherman Act. '
G. Injury or Fact of Damage, Calculation of the Amount
of Damages, and Injunctive Relief
Recovery of damages in an antitrust case requires proof that damages
resulted from, or were caused by, the antitrust violation.5 7 This .require-
ment is referred to as "the fact of damage," and must be shown if the
litigant is to have standing to sue.58 To show the fact of damage, as dis-
tinguished from showing the amount of damage, the claimant must sustain
the usual burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.5 9 If the
defendant claims the damages were attributable all or in part to other
50. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
51. Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
52. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967); Times-
Picayune Publ. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953); United States v. Klear-
flax Linen Looms, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 32 (D. Minn. 1945).
53. United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966); Helix Mil-
ing Co.- v. Terminal Flour Mills Co., 523 F.2d 1317 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1053 (1976).
54. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976).
55. Coleman Motor Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 1975-2 Trade Cas. 60,592 (3d
Cir. 1975); E. J. Delaney Corp. v. Bonne Belle, Inc., 525 F.2d 296 (10th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 907 (1976); Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 1977-1
Trade Cas. .61,529 (S.D. Ind. 1977).
56.' H. BROWN, FRANCHISING REALITIES AND RE-EDIm s 339-49' (1973).
57. Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555(1931).
58. Kaplan v. Burroughs Corp., 426 F. Supp. 1328 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
59. Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S., 251 (1946).
1980]
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causes, such as lack of capital, poor business judgment, or other reasons,
the defense has the burden of proof on those causes.60
Once the burden of proving the fact of injury and its causation has
been met, the amount of damages for antitrust violations can be shown
by meeting a less stringent burden of proof. The damage award need only
be supported by a reasonable estimate of monetary loss based on-relevant
data.61 The most common standard used in calculating damages'is the net
operating profit which would have been realized "but for" the antitrust
violation. The same theory also may be used to determine the capital loss,
such as that arising from the destruction of an entire business or of..one
product line.0 2 In an appropriate case, there might be adequate proof to
suppprt recovery for lost future profits.63 Proof of the fact of damage and
calculation of damage in antitrust cases usually requires testimony, of ex-
pert witnesses.64 The defendant has the burden of establishing any credits
against the proven damages. For example, where a franchisor made no
charge for the license to use the franchise, he may be entitled to a;credit
for the reasonable -value of the franchise. 65 After finding damages for anti-
trust violations, the amount must be trebled by-the court, together. with
an award of reasonable.attoreys' fees and other costs. 66
When representing a franchisee, injunctive relief to allow the fran-
chisee to continue operating pending the determination of the merits of
the dispute should be considered. Injunctive relief is difficult to obtain;
the franchisee must demonstrate a probability of success on the merits of
the dispute and irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted.6 7 Where
termination of the franchise threatens the franchisee's livelihood, the in-
junction may be thelonly way to preserve the business entity until a trial
on the merits occurs.
II. AcTiONS UNDER OTHER FEDERAL AND STATE STATUTES.
A. Federal Trade Commission Act
The Federal Trade Commission Act empowers the Federal- Trade
Commission (FTC) to prevent "unfair methods of competition and un-
60. Id.
61. Greene v. General Foods Corp., 517 F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
96 U.S. '1409 (1976); Flifttkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368 (9th Cir.Y; cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 835 (1957).
62. Greene v. General Foods Corp., 517 F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 942 (1976).
63. Deaktor v. Fox Grocery Co., 475 F.2d 1112 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, '414
U.S. 867 (1973).
64. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Goldwyn, 328 F.2d 190, 213 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 880 (1964). But see Rangen, Inc. v. Sterling Nelson &
Sons, 351 F.2d 851, 856 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966).
65., Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert dnTied,
405 U.S. 955 (1972). But see Carpa, Inc. v. Ward Foods, Inc., 536 F.2d 39' (5th
Cir. 1976) (credit for overdue royalties to franchisor guilty of tying violatibn not
allowed). '
66. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1976).
67. Response of Carolina v. Leasco Response, Inc., 498 F.2d .314 (5th' Cir.),
cert. denied, 4.19 U.S. 1050 "(1974).
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fair or deceptive acts and practices." 68 The purpose of the Act is to pro-
tect the public and not to punish the wrongdoer or to provide compensa-
tory damages for illegal practices. 69 Although the FTC is an independent
regulatory agency and may conduct administrative hearings, it does not
hold adversary proceedings between private litigants. A litigant may pe-
tition the Commission to take action against an alleged violator, but there
are no assurances that it will do so. The FTC has broad powers to order
restitution, seek temporary injunctions, issue regulations, and obtain ac-
celerated, industry-wide compliance with its orders.7 0
The Federal Trade Commission Act plays an important role in pro-
tecting franchisees from franchisor abuses and anticompetitive practices.
The definitions of "unfair methods of competition" and "unfair or de-
ceptive acts or practices" under that Act are flexible and may be adapted
to numerous business practices. The Commission can declare practices
unfair in light of the antitrust policies even though the practices may not
actually violate the antitrust laws or may be only incipient violations.' 1
A wide scope of activities affecting franchisees have been declared unlaw-
ful by the FTC.72 Under the 1975 expansion of the FTC's enforcement
powers, all cases decided by the Commission are binding precedent against
other companies.7 3 When handling disputes over franchise matters, the
decisions, consent orders, and advisory opinions of the FTC should be re-
viewed. Applicable rulings may resolve those disputes without resort to
private litigation.
The Commission promulgated a franchising disclosure and representa-
tion rule which became effective October 21, 1979. 7 4 In enacting this
rule, the Commission joins a number of states in regulating representations
of franchisors to prospective franchisees. 75 Under the rule, franchisors are
required to deliver disclosure statements to prospective franchisees cover-
ing specified topics of the franchise business. If representations are made
concerning sales, income, or profit, the franchisor is required to provide
a reasonable basis for making them.
Unlike many state franchise laws which require documents to be
filed with state administrators,7 6 the Commission's disclosure rule has no
filing requirements. It does not expressly provide for a private cause of
action for its violation. It remains to be seen if the courts will imply one.77
68. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (a) (6) (1976).
69. Regina Corp. v. FTC, 322TF.2d 765 (3d Cir. 1963).
70. See Rosch, Federal Developments Affecting Franchising-The FTC's Fran-
chising Rule, 47 ANTRusr L.J. 921 (1978).
71. FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966).
72. H. BRowN, FRANCHISING REALmiES AND REMEDIEs 151-55 (1973).
73. Magnuson-Moss'Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 19-21 (1976).
74. 16 C.F.R. § 436 (1979).
75. See Zeidman, supra note 2, at 874 n.8.
76. Id.
77. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
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B. Automobile Dealers' Franchise Act
In 1956 Congress amended the antitrust laws by adding the Automo-
bile Dealers' Franchise Act.Th This law permits a dealer who contends
that the franchisor did not act "in good faith and without coercion" in
terminating his franchise to bring a cause of action for damages in federal
court. Under that statute, courts have held that a franchisor may terminate
the franchise relationship for material breaches of valid contract pro-
visions,7 9 or for failure to meet sales quotas,8 0 observe quality standards,81
maintain an appropriate level of investment in his business,8 2 obtain a
suitable location,8 3 or to protect its business from potential liability aris-
ing from franchisee operations.8 4
On the other hand, coercive conduct which may justify damages or in-
junctive relief for wrongful termination has been found where the fran-
chise agreement was terminated for failure to comply with a franchisor's
price-fixing policies,8 5 for making objections to a franchisor's ownership
of a competitive dealership,86 and for refusal to abide by the franchisor's
requirement that franchisees stock unwanted products.8 7
C. Securities Act of 1933 and Securities and Exchange Act of 1934
Securities include "investment contracts," an often litigated term
which appears in the federal and most states' securities laws.8 8 Since 1946
the term "investment contracts" has been construed in light of the defini-
tion stated in SEC v. W. J. Howey Co.:8 9 a contract, transaction, or
scheme whereby money is invested in a common enterprise in which profits
are realized solely from the efforts of others.90 Franchise. agreements usually
do not qualify as investment contracts because the franchisee's participa-
tion in the business venture is active and not "solely" in reliance on the
78. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1225 (1976).
79. Woodard v. General Motors Corp., 298 F.2d 121 (5th Cir), cert. denied,
369 U.S. 887 (1962).
80. Frank Chevrolet Co. v. General Motors Corp., 419 F.2d 1054 (6th Cir.
1969).
81. R.A.C. Motors, Inc. v. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 314 F. Supp. 681
(D.N.J. 1970).
82. Pierce Ford Sales, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 299 F.2d 425 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 829 (1962).
83. Woodard v. General Motors Corp., 298 F.2d 121 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
369 U.S. 887 (1962).
84. David R. McGeorge Car Co. v. Leyland Motor Sales, Inc., 504 F.2d 52
(4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 992 (1975).
85. Randy's Studebaker Sales, Inc. v. Nissan Motor Corp., 533 F.2d 510 (10th
Cir. 1976).
86. Rea v. Ford Motor Co., 497 F.2d 577 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
868 (1974).
87. American Motors Sales Corp. v. Semke, 384 F.2d 192 (10th Cir. 1967).
See generally Autohaus Brugger, Inc. v. Saab Motors, Inc., 567 F.2d 901 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 946 (1978) (elements of violation of the A.D.F.A.).
88. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77 (b), 78 (c) (1976).
89. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
90. Id. at 298.
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efforts of others.91 In some cases, however, a franchise agreement may be
an investment contract and federal securities laws may be applicable. If
the investor is required to perform nominal or limited duties which have
little effect upon the profits of the enterprise, and if the franchisee has
supplied substantial amounts of capital to enable the franchisor to operate,
the agreement may constitute a security.92
To the extent that the franchise agreement is a security, several
remedies are available to franchisees under the securities laws. For ex-
ample, where deceptive acts and practices are committed in connection with
the offer or sale of a franchise agreement, a franchisor may be liable under
the antifraud provisions of section 17 (a) of the Securities Act of 1933,98
sections 10 (b) and 15 (c) (1) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934,94
and rule lOb-5 under the 1934 Act.95
I D. Petroleum Marketing Practices Act
The Petroleum Marketing Practices Act was enacted to protect service
station dealers from unwarranted terminations or non-renewals by fran-
chisors.9 6 The Act provides for notification procedures prior to termina-
tion or non-renewal 97 and sets out the grounds for termination and non-
renewal.98 The courts have broad equitable powers to deal with violations
of the Act, including the power to grant injunctive relief to compel con-
tinuation or renewal of the franchise.9 9 In addition to these remedies,
actual and exemplary damages and attorney and expert witness fees may
be awarded. 100 State laws which conflict with or contravene the provisions
of the Act are preempted0lo
E. Missouri Statutes Applicable to Franchising
I. Notice of Termination Statute
The term franchise is defined and regulated to some degree by
statute in Missouri.' 02 Franchisors are required to give franchisees ninety
days notice before they cancel, terminate, or fail to renew franchise agree-
ments.' 0 3 Failure to give the required notice gives rise to a right to re-
cover damages sustained, including loss of goodwill, costs of the suit, and
any equitable relief the court deems appropriate.104
91. Chapman v. Rudd Paint & Varnish Co., 409 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1969);
Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River City Steak, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 640 (D. Colo. 1970), modi-
fied, 460 F.2d 666 (10th Cir. 1972).
92. Lennerth v. Mendenhall, 234 F. Supp. 59 (D. Ohio 1964).
93. 15 U.S.C. § 77 (g) (1976).
94. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78 (j), 78 (o) (a) (1) (1976).
95. 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1979).
96. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2806 (1976).
97. Id. § 2804.
98. Id. § 2802.
99. Id. § 2805.
100. Id. § 2805 (b) (1).
101. Id. § 2806.
102. RSMo § 407.400 (1978).
103. Id. § 407.405.
104. Id. § 407.410 (2).
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2. Termination of Wholesale Liquor Franchise Without Cause
A special Missouri statute provides that wholesale liquor franchises may
be terminated only for good cause. 105 Good cause includes requiring, the
franchisor to comply with reasonable terms of the agreement and not to
act in bad faith or without observing reasonable commercial standards
of fair dealing in the trade.1 06 The franchisee is granted a cause of action
for violations of that statute and may recover monetary damages and
reasonable attorneys' fees. 107
3. False Advertising Statute,
The Missouri false advertising statute may provide a claim for relief
to franchisees who are misled by franchisor advertising. 0 8 The statute
creates a right of action on behalf of private citizens who suffer irijury by
reason of the false. advertising, 09 and also specifically provides for the
maintenance of a class action. The elements of this cause of action are
similar to the elements for proof of the common law tort of fraud.110 . The
franchisee should consider the possibility of using this action in-conjunc-
tion with a fraud action or with a Missouri antitrust claim.
The statute also authorizes the Missouri Attorney General to. institute
civil action against persons engaging in fraudulent or deceptive :advertis-
ing."' Private litigants may use a judgment, obtained by the attorney
general as prima facie evidence of liability in a private action. 112
IV. COMMON LAW LIABILrrY
A. Fiduciary Relationship
Under the basic franchise agreement an independent business person
,(franchisee) agrees to invest money and time in a business to be operated
under the guidance of the franchisor. Many franchisees are eager but,,know
little about the franchised business. The franchisor usually purports to
have many years of experience and in-depth knowledge about each facet
of the business which it agrees to place at the complete disposal of; the
franchisee. The franchisee under these circumstances often finds himself
totally dependent upon the good counsel of the franchisor. Various, pro-
visions contained in standard franchise agreements which requite the
franchisee to lease his store premises from the franchisor, purchase' certain
goods from the, franchisor, and adhere to the franchisor's policies and
procedures, place the franchisor in the overwhelming position of ,being
105. Id. § 407.413.
106. Id. § 407.413 (5).
107. Id. § 407.413 (3).
108. Id. §§ 407.010-.130.
109. Id. § 407.025.
110. State ex rel. Danforth v. Independence Dodge, Inc., 494 S.W.2d' 362
(Mo. App., D.K.C. 1973).
111. RSMo §§ 407.040, .100 (1978).
112. Id. § 407.025(8).
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the franchisee's lessor, creditor, chief business advisor, and trusted busi-
ness counselor. Under these circumstances a special relationship described
as, "fiduciary" in nature which is akin to that of principal and agent
may arise between franchisor and franchisee.11 3
The existence of a fiduciary relationship is relevant to many common
law theories of responsibility, discussed below, running from the fran-
chisor to the franchisee. The mere fact that such a relationship exists
creates a special obligation on the part of the franchisor to deal with its
franchisee in a forthright and helpful manner. Whether a fiduciary. rela-
tionship normally exists between franchisees and franchisors is a question
of contemporary significance and has not been fully explored by the courts.
Recent state and federal cases indicate that a fiduciary relationship may
exist.Y": Many courts, rather than ruling that a fiduciary relationship can
never exist in a franchising arrangement, have held that the franchisee
failed to proffer sufficient evidence to support its claim that a fiduciary
relationship actually existed in the particular case.1 15
Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
has recently held that -a fiduciary relationship exists between franchisor
and. franchisee, no Missouri court has specifically held that a fiduciary
duty exists upon the mere presence of a franchisor-franchisee relationship.
Rather than litigate this issue head on, however, the franchisee should argue
that, regardless of whether the court believes a fiduciary duty should always
be implied in a franchisor-franchisee situation, sufficient "special circum-
stances" exist in the case before it to justify finding a fiduciary relatiol-
ship.116
.113. H. BRowN, FRANCHIsING REALITIES AND RxEm.rEs 134 (1973).
114. See, e.g., Arnott v. American Oil Co., No. 79-1150 (8th Cir., Oct. 24, 197.9).
As stated in Ellis v. Zuck, 409 F. Supp. 1151, 1158 (N.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd, 546
F.2d 643 (5th Cir. 1977):
While this state [Alabama] has not had occasion to consider the relation-
ship between franchisor and franchisee, a few courts and several commen-
tators have suggested that a confidential and fiduciary relationship exists
between parties to 'a franchise arrangement. Broomfield v. Kosow, 349
Mass. 749, 755, 212 N.E.2d 556, 560 (1963); Meinhard v. Salmon, 249
N.Y. 458, 467, 164 N.E. 545, 548 (1928); see also, Rosenfeld, Big Brother
as a Fiduciary: Suing the Franchisor, Case S: Comment, July-Aug. 1971,
at 28. Brown, Franchising: Fraud, Concealment and Full Disclosure, 33
Ohio State L.J. 517, 548 (1972); Goodwin, Franchising and the Economy:
The Franchise Agreement as a Security under Securities Acts, 24 Bus.
Law 1311, 1319 (1969). Other courts have recognized the disparity be-
tween the parties to a franchise arrangement as requiring a duty to dis-
close. See, e.g., Weaver v. American Oil. Co., 357 Ind. 458, 276 N.E.2d
144 (1971).
115. Arnott v. American Oil Co., No. 79-1150 (8th Cir.. Oct. 24, 1979) (hold-
ing that a fiduciary relationship exists between franchisor and franchisee); Eaton,
Yale & Towne, Inc. v. Sherman Indus. Equip. Co., 316 F. Supp. 435 (E.D. Mo.
1970); Scott-Douglas Corp. v. Greyhound Corp., 304 A.2d 309 (Del. Super: 1973);
(holding that "special circumstances" exist in the particular fact situation which
justify the finding of a fiduciary relationship).
116. Eaton, Yale & .Towne, Inc. v. Sherman Indus. Equip. Co., 316 F. Supp.
435 (E.D. Mo. 1970).
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A fiduciary relationship exists when one person is under a duty to
give advice and assistance to another on matters within the scope of the
relationship. 117 Such a relationship "exists in all cases where there has
been a special confidence reposed in one who in equity and good con-
science is bound to act in good faith, and with due regard to the interest
of the one reposing the confidence." 118
In determining the existence of a fiduciary relationship a court need
not rely solely upon written agreements existing between the parties,
although such documents as brochures, franchise agreements, and lease
agreements can be very helpful in establishing such a relationship. Courts
regularly examine all proffered evidence of special circumstances that tend
to show a relationship between the parties that is fiduciary in nature.
Many of the special circumstances do not appear on the face of the con-
tract between the parties, such as the relative bargaining positions of the
parties," 9 whether one party reposed special trust or confidence in the
other party,' 20 or whether one party to the relationship was aware that
the other party was relying upon him.12' Therefore, the review is not
limited to written documents. The entire relationship between the parties
must be scrutinized fully to determine whether a fiduciary relationship ex-
ists. This, of course, is a factual question for the jury.
B. Conspiracy Actions
Conspiracies to restrain trade and monopolize under sections 1 and 2
of the Sherman Act and under comparable Missouri antitrust laws have
been discussed above. In addition, the general concept of a civil con-
spiracy to commit a wrong should always be considered in franchise liti-
gation. A cause of action sounding in tort exists for damnages resulting
from overt acts done pursuant to a conspiratorial agreement. 2 2 In Mis-
souri, a civil conspiracy is defined as:
A combination of two or more persons acting in concert to com-
mit an unlawful act, or to commit a lawful act by unlawful means,
the principal element of which is an agreement between the par-
ties to inflict a wrong against or injury upon another and an
overt act that results in damage.' 23
Successful proof of a conspiracy affords the plaintiff several benefits,
117. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 874, Comment a (1977).
118. Klika v. Albert Wenzlick Real Estate Co., 150 S.W.2d 18, 24 (St. L. Mo.
App. 1941).
119. Hall Motor Co. v. Furman, 285 Ala. 499, 234 So. 2d 37 (1970).
120. Klika v. Albert Wenzlick Real Estate Co., 150 S.W.2d 18, 24 (St. L. Mo.
App. 1941).
121. Broomfield v. Kosow, 349 Mass. 49, 212 N.E.2d 556 (1965).
122. Royster v. Baker, 365 S.W.2d 496, 499 (Mo. 1963); Haynes v. Hawkeye
Sec. Ins. Co., 579 S.W.2d 693, 703 (Mo. App., W.D. 1979).
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including: joint and several liability of the defendants; 12 4 conversion of
a contract action into an action sounding in tort under which punitive
damages are collectible;1 2 5 extension of the statute of limitations to the
last overt act done pursuant to the conspiracy; 126 permitting evidence di-
rected at one defendant to be used against the other defendants, subject to
subsequent proof of the conspiracy; 127 and, injection of a sinister motive
on the part of the defendants which could have a significant impact on
the jury's determination of both actual and punitive damages.
The basis of a conspiracy action is not the conspiracy itself but rather
the wrong done to the plaintiff by acts in furtherance of the conspiracy.' 28
A conspiracy cannot be the subject of a civil action unless something is
done which, without the conspiracy, would give rise to a cause of action.
Thus, allegations of conspiratorial conduct should always be made in con-
junction with allegations of conduct which, if done by itself, would con-
stitute an actionable wrong.129
A combination for the purpose of causing a breach of contract has
been held to constitute an unlawful conspiracy. A person who by con-
spiring with another violates his contract with a third person commits an
actionable wrong.'3 0 A conspiracy to breach a contract can be based upon
a third party beneficiary theory in which the plaintiff is not a formal party
to the contract.' 3' For example, if the franchisor leases store premises from
a landlord and then subleases the premises to its franchisee, the franchisee
may have an action against its franchisor and the underlying landlord for
conspiracy to violate the lease if the franchisor and landlord fail to ad-
here to provisions of the lease. Such a situation might arise if the lease
required that certain stores be located in the shopping center and the
stores never opened. It could also occur if the lease provided that certain
types of stores would not be located in the shopping center and these types
of stores in fact opened.
Damages for breach of contract are generally limited to the pecuniary
loss sustained. However, where the breach is occasioned by a conspiracy to
124. Brennaman v. Andes & Roberts Bros. Constr. Co., 506 S.W.2d 462, 466
(Mo. App., D.K.C. 1973); Mills v. Murray, 472 S.W.2d 6, 12 (K.C. Mo. App.
1971); Wooldridge v. Scott County Milling Co., 102 S.W.2d 958, 964 (Spr. Mo.
App. 1937).
125. Dickey v. Johnson, 532 S.W.2d 487 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1975); Mills v.
Murray, 472 S.W.2d 6, 17 (K.C. Mo. App. 1971).
126. Kansas City v. Rathford, 353 Mo. 1130, 186 S.W.2d 570 (1945).
127. State v. Davies, 80 Mo. App. 239, 244 (St. L. 1899); FED. R. EviD. 801.
128. Mills v. Murray, 472 S.W.2d 6 (K.C. Mo. App. 1971).
129. For example, in a petition for damages one should not merely allege
that a civil conspiracy injured the plaintiff. Instead, the allegation should be
that the defendants conspired to breach a contract, to make fraudulent statements,
etc.
130. Rosen v. Alside, Inc., 248 S.W.2d 638 (Mo. 1952).
131. Bukovac v. Lloyd Ketcham Oldsmobile, Inc., 479 S.W.2d 790, 795 (Mo.
App., W.D. 1979) (breach of agreement for benefit of plaintiff constitutes a con-
spiracy; punitive damages appropriate).
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defraud and the action sued on is for the tort-the fraud committed-ex-
emplary damages may ensue.18 2
One must be imaginative when looking for a conspiracy or concerted
action. The obvious situation giving rise to a conspiracy is that where
two or more persons are involved in a transaction. This may occur where
the -franchisee feels he has suffered because of actions taken by his fran-
chisor in concert with other persons such as the landlord, suppliers, credi-
tors, or other franchisees. One might even be able to find a conspiracy
between the franchisor and the plaintiff-franchisee, himself if the fran-
chisee, due to his subservient position, is forced into a situation where he
must acquiesce to the franchisor's wrongful conduct.133
It should not be assumed that one can always use the vehicle of a
conspiracy merely because there are two or more defendants. A plaintiff
alleging a conspiracy must prove its existence by clear and convincing
evidence,18 4 but because of its covert nature, a conspiracy may be shown
by circumstantial evidence.135 If a plaintiff fails to prove a conspiracy he
may still recover against one or more of the defendants shown to have been
guilty-of the alleged wrong.1386
C. Fraud and Misrepresentation
Successful proof of a claim based on fraud or misrepresentation has
definite advantages. Punitive damages can be collected 13 7 and actual dam-
ages may be enhanced due to the nature of the evidence offered to support
punitive damages. The elements of a fraud action in Missouri are:
[A] representation; its falsity; its materiality; knowledge on
the part of the one who makes the representation that it is false
or his ignorance of its truth; intent that the representation should
be acted upon; the actor's ignorance of the falsity; reliance on the
representation; [and the] right to rely. 133
Applying the above factors to the franchisor-franchisee relationship should
not be difficult. To sell its product to the franchise the franchisor must
make certain statements to the franchisee regarding the nature of the
franchisor's business, the franchisor's expertise, and the franchisee's chance
of success. If in selling the franchise program the franchisor makes state-
ments which are fraudulent or misleading, and the franchisee relies upo'n
tlese statements to his detriment, the franchisee may have a tort cause of
132. Byers Bros. Real Estate & Ins. Agency v. Campbell, 353 S.W.2d 102 (K.C.
Mo. App. 1961).
133. Albrecht v. The Herald Co., 390 U.S. i45 (1968).
134. National Rejectors, Inc. v. Trieman, 409 S.W.2d 1, 50 (Mo. En Banc
1966); Mills v. Murray, 472 S.W.2d 6, 12 (K.C. Mo. App. 1971).
135. Steffan v. World Wide Sports, Inc., 502 S.W.2d 264 (Mo. 1973).
136. Rosen v. Alside, Inc., 248 S.W.2d 638 (Mo. 1952); Medich v. Stippec,
335 Mo. 796, 73 S.W.2d 998 (1934).
137. Dickey v. Johnson, 532 S.W.2d 487 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 197,5).
138. American Fire & Indem. Co. v. Lancaster, 286 F. Supp. 1011, 1015 (E.D.
Mo. 1968), afrd, 415 F.2d 1145 (8th Cir. 1969).
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action against the franchisor sounding in fraud, an alternative to a breach
of contract action.' 39
1. Intentional Misrepresentations
One who fraudulently misrepresents a fact, opinion, intention, or
law for the purpose of inducing another to act or to refrain from acting
in reliance upon the statement is subject to liability to the other for fraud.
A misrepresentation may be fraudulent under one of the following three
circumstances:
(1) The maker knows or believes the situation is not as he repre-
sents;
(2) The maker does not have the confidence in the accuracy of
his representation that he states or implies; or
(3) The maker knows that he does not have the basis for the
representation that he states or implies.14°
If the franchisor makes an ambiguous representation either with the in-
tention that it be understood in a false sense, without any belief or ex-
pectation as to how it will be understood, or with reckless indifference as
to how the franchisee might understand it, the franchisee may have a cause
of action for deceit.' 4 '
If the franchisor gives the franchisee documents which contain false
statements such as a franchise or lease agreement, the franchisor can be
held liable in deceit. Actionable fraudulent statements may be communi-
cated either in writing or verbally. 42 In Missouri, the fact that the fraudu-
lent representation is contained in a contract is not dispositive. The key
inquiry in a fraud or deceit action is the promisor's intention at the time
of contracting. If the promisor intends to perform the promise at the time
the contract is executed but fails to do so, the promisee's only remedy is
to file an action for breach of contract.143 However, if at the time of con-
tracting the promisor did not have the current intention to perform the
promises contained in the contract, he has misrepresented his intentions
and an action in fraud may be maintained. 144 For example, if the fran-
chisor makes certain representations in a lease agreement as to what other
tenants will be in the shopping center with the franchisee, when the
franchisor either knows that the tenants will not be available or has
139. Northern v. McGraw-Edison Co., 542 F.2d 1336 (8th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1097 (1977)(Missouri franchisee successfully used fraud theory
against franchisor as an alternative to federal antitrust law).
140. R STATEmMNT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 526 (1977).
141. Id. § 527.
142. Id. § 532.
143. 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 11, at 234 (1943).
144. See Clayton Brokerage Co. v. Teleswitcher Corp., 418 F. Supp, 83 (E.D.
Mo. 1976), aff'd, 555 F.2d 1349 (8th Cir. 1977) (fraud established when defendant
promised to perform various contracted-for services, but did not have the pres-
ent intention to perform); Brennaman v. Andes & Roberts Bros. Constr. Co., 506
S.W.2d 462 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1973) (misrepresentation of intention to perform
agreement held to state claim for relief in fraud). See also RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 530, Comment c (1977).
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no expectation of obtaining them, the franchisor may be subject to suit
by the franchisee based upon deceit. This is true even though the par-
ticular misrepresentation may have been communicated to the franchisee
only indirectly through statements addressed to a third person and over-
heard by the franchisee with the knowledge of the franchisor, or through
receipt of a document provided by the franchisor to a third person with
the reasonable expectation that it would be seen and relied upon by the
franchisee.145
a. Presumption of Fraud
If a fiduciary or confidential relationship exists between the fran-
chisor and franchisee, the franchisor will owe a high degree of honesty and
fair play to the franchisee. Contrary to the general rule that fraud is not
presumed,140 certain improper dealings by one party standing in a fi-
duciary or confidential relationship, which adversely affect another party
to the relationship, may be presumed to be fraudulent.14 7 It has been
stated that:
Although as a general rule fraud is not presumed, and the
burden of establishing it rests on the party who alleges it, that
rule is somewhat relaxed in cases where a fiduciary relation exists
between the parties to a transaction or contract, and where one
has a dominant and controlling force or influence over the other.
In such cases, if the superior party obtains a possible benefit,
equity raises a presumption against the validity of the transaction
or contract, and casts upon such party the burden of proving
fairness, honesty, and integrity in the transaction or contract.
He must show that there was no abuse of the confidence, that he
has acted in good faith, and that the act by which he is benefited
was the free, voluntary, and independent act of the other party,
done with full knowledge of its purpose and effect.1
48
If the dominant party does not fulfill its duty of good faith, fraud may
be presumptively established.' 49
The existence of a fiduciary or confidential relationship between the
franchisor and franchisee is significant for yet another reason. Because the
law requires the utmost honesty and fair play in such a relationship, courts
have recognized that a breach of a fiduciary or confidential duty consti-
tutes constructive fraud.15a The burden of proof for one victimized by con-
structive fraud is relaxed because he need not prove actual dishonesty or
intent to deceive.' 5 1
145. RFrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 533 (1977).
146. Bolten v. Colburn, 389 S.W.2d 384 (K.C. Mo. App. 1965).
147. See Andres v. Brown, 300 S.W.2d 800 (Mo. 1957); Breckle v. Van Dyke
Brewing Co., 483 S.W.2d 672 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1972).
148. 37 AM. JUR. 2d Fraud and Deceit § 441 (1968).
149. Acy v. Inland Sec. Co., 287 S.V.2d 347 (K.C. Mo. App. 1956).
150. Mahler v. Tieman, 550 S.W.2d 623 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1977); 37 C.J.S.
Fraud § 2 (c) (1943).
151. Vogt v. Town 9: Country Realty, 194 Neb. 308, 231 N.W.2d 496 (1975).
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b. Puffing and the Duty to Disclose
It is a traditional principle of fraud law that mere expressions of
opinion or "puffing" are not actionable. 152 This rule is premised on the
belief that reasonable people generally have no right to rely on another
person's commendatory and self-serving statements.' 53 Fraudulent mis-
representation of an opinion, however, can be actionable if the maker
purports to have special knowledge of the matter,154 stands in a fiduciary
or similar relationship,' 55 or has some other special reason to expect that
the recipient will rely on the opinion.156
Some cases have questioned whether there is an affirmative duty to
disclose a fact which one knows may induce another to act or refrain
from acting. It is generally held that liability for deceit may follow from
nondisclosure if the defendant is under a duty to the other person to ex-
ercise reasonable care to disclose the matter in question.15 7 This duty
may exist in the special circumstances surrounding the franchisor-fran-
chisee relationship. It is normally held that one party to a business trans-
action is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to disclose pertinent
information to the other party when one of the following circumstances
exists: a fidicuary or other similar relationship of trust and confidence
exists between the parties; 58 the party making the representations realizes
that information he has is necessary to prevent his partial or ambiguous
statement of the facts from being misleading; 59 or the person having the
duty of disclosure knows that subsequently acquired information he pos-
sesses will make untrue or misleading prior statements that were true or
believed to be true when originally made. a0
152. Whittlesey v. Spence, 439 S.W.2d 195 (Spr. Mo. App. 1969); McAlpine
Co. v. draham, 320 S.W.2d 951 (St. L. Mo. App. 1959).
153. See W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS § 109 (4th ed. 1971).
154. Dawes v. Elliston, 369 S.W.2d 285 (K.C. Mo. App. 1963).
155. Motor Transp. Springfield v. Orval Davis Tire Co., 585 S.A.2d 195 (Mo.
App., S.D. 1979).
156. Doll v. Purple Shoppe, 230 Mo. App. 256, 90 S.W.2d 181 (K.C. 1936).
157. RFrATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 551 (1977).
158. Motor Transp. Springfield v. Oval Davis Tire Co., 585 S.W.2d 195 (Mo.
App., S.D. 1979).
159. Doll v. Purple Shoppe, 230 Mo. App. 256, 90 S.W.2d 181 (K.C. 1936).
160. "The common law has long required that a person who has made a
representation must correct that representation if it becomes false and if he
knows people are relying on it. This duty to disclose is imposed regardless of the
interest of defendant in the representation and subsequent nondisclosure." Fischer
v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180, 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). See also St. Joseph Hosp. v. Cor-
betta Constr. Co., 21 Ill. App. 3d 925, 316 N.E.2d 51 (1974); RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTs § 551 (c) (1977). There is no essential distinction betWeen affirma-
tive misrepresentation and a failure to correct a representation subsequently
known to be false.
One who, having made a representation which when made was true
or believed to be so, remains silent after he has learned that it is untrue
and that the person to whom it is made is relying upon it in a trans-
action with him, is morally and legally in the same position as if he knew
that his statement was false when made.
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Although there is an affirmative duty to disclose past misstatements of
fact irrespective of the relationship between the parties, the duty of full
and complete disclosure may be heightened when the franchisor-franchisee
relationship exists between the parties. Where there is a relationship of
trust and confidence, inequality of condition, or superior knowledge of one
party, there is an affirmative duty to disclose all material facts. Failure to
do so constitutes fraud. 16 1 Thus, the franchisor as a fiduciary or as a
person in a position of trust and confidence may have an affirmative duty
to disclose various information to his franchisee. For example, when such
things as brochures and manuals which specify the products and/or serv-
ices the franchisee is to receive from the franchisor become obsolete, the
franchisor has a duty to inform the franchisee that the prior representa-
tions, although perhaps true when made, have become untrue and/or mis-
leading.16 2
2. Negligent Misrepresentations
One who in the course of business supplies false information to
others for their guidance is liable to those persons for any pecuniary loss
caused by reliance on the information if the supplier of the information
has failed to exercise reasonable care in obtaining or communicating the
information. 0 3 A franchisor who supplies misleading information to a
franchisee due to the franchisor's negligence in either gathering or dis-
seminating the information may be liable to the franchisee in an action
based upon negligent misrepresentation. The franchisor must use reason-
able care to assure that statements made to its franchisees on various busi-
ness matters are correct.
In J. Louis Crum Corp. v. Alfred Lindgren, Inc.,164 the court rec-
ognized that a tort cause of action exists in Missouri for negligent mis-
representation. The Crum court noted that liability for negligent mis-
representation has been found where the plaintiff is a member of a group
that the negligent actor seeks to influence, and where the negligent
actor has special reason to know that some member of the limited group
will rely on the information misrepresented.' 65 The court in Crum, how-
ever, refused to extend the above line of cases to hold a defendant liable
for a negligent act which merely interferes with a contract right. The
negligence must rise to the level of a misrepresentation.1 66
Id. § 551 (c), Comment h (1977). Courts applying this principle of law have not
required the existence of a fiduciary or confidential relationship between the
parties.
161. Jones v. Arnold, 359 Mo. 161, 221 S.W.2d 187 (1949); Parker v. Green,
340 S.W.2d 435 (K.C. Mo. App. 1960).
162. Vinyard v. Herman, 578 S.W.2d 938 (Mo. App., S.D. 1979) (discussing
how existence of fiduciary relationship can ease burden of proving fraud).
163. R STATEMiENT (SECOND) op TORTS § 552 (1977). See also Gerich v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 588 S.W.2d 107 (Mo. App., W.D. 1979).
164. 564 S.W.2d 544 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1978).
165. Id. at 551.
166. See Gerich v. General Motors Corp., 588 S.W.2d 107 (Mo. App., W.D.
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D. Breach of Contract
In any action against its franchisor, the franchisee will want to con-
sider a breach of contract claim. The basic franchise agreement often
provides many opportunities for such a claim. When considering a breach
of contract claim, all documents'embodying agreements between the par-
ties should be examined. It is a well recognized principle of law that even
though writings may be separate, if executed contemporaneously, they will
be construed together and considered to constitute one transaction when
the parties and the subject matter are the same and the relationship be-
tween the documents is clearly apparent. Any ambiguity in the documents
will be construed against the party (usually the franchisor) preparing
them.167
With regard to covenants, conditions, and warranties not specifically
embodied in a written document, Professor Williston points out that,
"[I]n every contract there exists an implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing."'168 Some courts have referred to this as a necessary implica-
tion from the express intent of the parties. 6 9 It has also been declared that,
"[I]n every contract there is an implied covenant that neither party will
do anything having the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the
other party to receive the fruits of the contract."' 70 This concept can be
very useful to the franchisee when interpreting the franchisor's actions in
light of written or oral contracts, and can be important if the franchisee
seeks recoupment.
The doctrine of recoupment may apply when a franchisor, after hav-
ing required a franchisee to make a sizable investment in the franchise,
terminates the franchise without just cause, thereby leaving the franchisee
with substantial unrecovered expenditures. In Missouri a franchise agree-
ment silent as to duration and which does not deal specifically with termi-
nation is construed to be terminable at the will of either party.171 Recoup-
ment is an important exception or limitation to this general rule.172 Where
1979) (broad imposition of liability for negligent misrepresentation if actor cloaked
with authority to make representation and did so without knowledge of truth
of statement).
167. Structure Sys., Inc. v. Hereford, 564 S.W.2d 62 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1978);
Bradley v. Buffington, 500 S.W.2d 314 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1973).
168. S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1926 (1936).
169. See, e.g., Motel Managers Training School, Inc. v. Merryfield, 347 F.2d
27 (9th Cir. 1965) (implied covenant of feasibility in sale of franchise).
170. Lutz v. Bayberry Huntington, Inc., 148 N.Y.S.2d 762, 767 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
171. Superior Concrete Acc. v. Kemper, 284 S.W.2d 482 (Mo. 1955); Want v.
Century Supply Co., 508 S.W.2d 515 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1974).
172. Beebe v. Columbia Axle Co., 233 Mo. App. 212, 218, 117 S.W.2d 624, 629
(K.C. 1938), states:
The limitation is that, in any case of an indefinite agency where it is
revoked by the principal, if it appears that the agent, induced by his ap-
pointment, has in good faith incurred expense and devoted time and
labor in the matter of the agency without having had a sufficient op-
portunity to recoup such from the undertaking, the principal will be re-
quired to compensate him in that behalf; for the law will not permit one
1980]
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the franchise has been terminated by the franchisor without just cause be-
fore the franchisee has had a reasonable opportunity to recoup his capital
investment, the franchisee is entitled to recoupment on a quantum meruit
theory.17 3
In some situations a franchisee may wish to avoid the obligations: of
the franchise agreement, in effect setting the franchise contract aside. A
contract or conveyance in Missouri may be set aside because of fraud or
deception surrounding its making.11 4 Missouri courts are particularly in-
clined to cancel a contract on the ground of fraud in its procurement if a
confidential relationship was instrumental in the execution of the con-
tract. 75 Thus, one of the remedies the franchisee may have is rescission
and/or avoidance of the franchise contract itself.
The Uniform Commercial Code also may be helpful to a franchisee
who desires to avoid the obligations of a particularly harsh franchise
agreement. Section 2-302 provides that a court may refuse to enforce a
contract if it finds as a matter of law that the contract or any clause thereof
is unconscionable. In Ashland Oil Inc. v. Donahuse,1 6 the court fourd.
section 2-302 to prohibit as unconscionable the enforcement of a contract
provision granting a franchisor the unilateral right to terminate a franchise
agreement upon ten days notice following a determination that the fran-
chisee had impaired the reputation of the franchised product. 77 Ashland
Oil is significant because it is one of the first cases to apply the Code's
unconscionability provision to a franchise agreement, and further be-
cause the court indicated that a franchisee need not show a lack of aware-
ness of the terms of the contract or a lack of choice in the formation of a
contract in order to prevail under section 2-302. In addition, the burden
of rebutting the presumption that termination without good cause is sub-
stantively unconscionable is shifted to the franchisor, and parol evidence
thus to deprive another of value without awarding just compensation.
The just principle acted upon by the courts in the circumstances sug-
gested requires no more than that, in every instance, the agent shall
be afforded a reasonable opportunity to avail himself of the primary ex-
penditures and efforts put forth to the end of executing the authority
conferred upon him and that, if such opportunity is denied him, the
principal shall compensate him accordingly.
173. Gibbs v. Bardahl Oil Co., 331 S.W.2d 614 (Mo. 1960); Glover v. Hender-
son, 120 Mo. 367, 25 S.W. 175 (1894); Want v. Century Supply Co., 508 S.W.2d
515 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1974). See also Berra v. Bieg Plumbing Co., 584 S.W.2d
116 (Mo. App., E.D. 1979) (discussing proof required in quantum meruit case).
See generally Lockewill, Inc. v. United States Shoe Corp., 547 F.2d 1024 (8t" Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 956 (1977); Annot., 19 A.L.R.3d 196 (1968).
174. Hart v. Midkiff, 321 S.W.2d 500 (Mo. 1959).
175. Drake v. Greener, 523 S.W.2d 601 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1975).
176. 223 S.E.2d 433 (W. Va. 1976).
177. Other cases applying the UCC to termination of a franchise agreement are
Goldinger v. Boron Oil Co., 375 F. Supp. 400 (W.D. Pa. 1974), aff'd, 511 F.2d
1393 (3d Cir. 1975); Division of Triple T Serv., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 60 Misc.
2d 720, 304 N.Y.S.2d 191 (Sup. Ct. 1969), afrd, 34 App. Div. 2d 618, 311 N.Y.S.2d
961 (1970); W.L. May Co. v. Philco-Ford Corp., 273 Or. 701, 543 P.2d 283 (1975).
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is admissible for the purpose of disclosing the underlying agreement of the
parties concerning the unconscionable termination provision.178
E. Covenants Not to Compete
When the franchise agreement terminates either by its own terms
or upon the action of either the franchisee or the franchisor, the parties
frequently find themselves in potential competition. The franchisee may
desire to continue in business either under the same or a different name.
The franchisor may continue in the market either through use of its own
facility, commonly referred to as a company-owned store, or by franchis-
ing.someone else. Franchise agreements may contain a covenant running
from the franchisee to the franchisor in which the franchisee agrees that,
upon termination of the franchise agreement, he will not engage in a
business similar to that encompassed by the franchise. In interpreting the
validity or "reasonableness" of such covenants not to compete, courts
consider all circumstances surrounding the covenant including the subject
matter of the contract, the purpose to be served by the covenant, the situa-
tion of the parties, the extent of the restraint, and the specialization of the
business.1 9
Once the franchise has been terminated both the franchisor and fran-
chisee must consider the manner in which they may thereafter compete. For
example, if the franchisor comes into the marketplace and attempts to
solicit customers of its former franchisee, thereby causing those customers
to breach their contract with the franchisee, the franchisor may be guilty
of tortious interference with contract. Alternatively, if the franchisee so-
licits the franchisor's customers in an improper manner he may be sub-
ject to liability. This is not to say, however, that a former franchisor and
franchisee cannot actively compete if they do so in a legitimate manner.
The M 4issouri Court of Appeals, St. Louis District, recently set out five
necesssary elements to establish a tortious interference with contract: (1)
existence of a contract; (2) knowledge of the contract by the defendant;
(3) breach of the contract induced or caused by the defendant; (4) de-
fendant's acts not justified; and (5) plaintiff suffered damages.189
F. Class Actions
Perhaps no other type of litigation has called upon the class action
device so frequently as has franchise litigation. This is true because the
franchisor typically uses standard practices, procedures, and forms when
178. For an in depth discussion of Ashland Oil, see Note, Uniform Commer-
cial Code-§ 2-302-Unilateral Right of Termination for Cause Determined Solely
by Franchisor Unconscionable, 55 TEx. L. REv. 541 (1977).
179. Chemical Fireproofing Corp. v. Bronska, 542 S.W.2d 74 (Mo. App.,
D. St. *L. 1976) (discussing reasonableness of time and area restrictions); R.E.
Harrington, Inc. v. Frick, 428 S.W.2d 945, 950 (St. L. Mo. App. 1968).
180. Smith v. Standard Oil, 567 S.W.2d 412, 417 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1978).
See also Tri-Continental Leasing Co. v. Neidhardt, 540 S.W.2d 210, 212 (Mo.
App., D. St. L. 1976).
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dealing with its franchisees. Thus, the grievance of one franchisee is often
common to all franchisees. Rule 52.08 of the Missouri Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure is the pertinent class action rule in Missouri and is identical to
rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Federal cases interpreting
rule 23 are important when considering the Missouri rule. An extensive
treatment of class actions is beyond the scope of this paper, but the class
action device should be considered by any franchisee contemplating litiga-
tion against his franchisor.
Before filing a class action the franchisee should carefully review the
decisions concerning the necessity under rule 52.08 (b) (3) of having com-
mon questions of law or fact "predominate" over individual questions.
Thus, one of the determining factors in deciding whether to permit a
class action is whether the claims of all the franchisees can be handled
efficiently as well as simultaneously. This necessitates a detailed analysis
of the cause of action asserted on behalf of class members. If the cause of
action is such that its proof by one franchisee against the franchisor will
prove the same cause of action on behalf of all franchisees, a class action
may be proper. If, however, the cause of action is such that establishing
liability on behalf of one franchisee will not help prove the claims of
other franchisees, a class action is inappropriate.' 8 '
Missouri and federal courts may create subclasses in order to segregate
certain issues for class action treatment.' 8 2 Liability may be tried on a
class-wide basis even though individual trials are necessary to determine
the amount of damages to which each class member is entitled.'8 3
Perhaps the case most often cited by franchisees in support of a re-
quest for a class action is Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc.'8 4 This case in-
volved various antitrust claims including illegal tying of merchandise to
the trademark. It is a good case with which to begin researching class
actions, but it is only a starting point. Hundreds of cases have been
handed down since Siegel which change and modify the concepts estab-
lished therein. Due to the rash of class actions experienced by federal
courts in recent years, judges at the federal level are becoming more con-
servative in granting class actions. What once was a flood tide of class
actions has now been throttled to a mere trickle by the federal judiciary.
Most state courts, however, have not yet adopted the same approach.
181. For example, if a franchisee desires to assert a fraud claim against his
franchisor he may do so based upon either written or verbal representations made
to him by the franchisor. If the fraudulent statements are contained in a written
publication given to all franchisees, a class action may be appropriate since the
claims of all franchisees will be based upon the same fraudulent statement. How-
ever, if each franchisee must prove separate verbal representations made to him
by various employees of the franchisor, a class action is most likely inappropriate.
182. Mo. R. Civ. P. 52.08 (b) (4); FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (c) (4).
183. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968), rev'd
on other grounds, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
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V. CONCLUSION
The tremendous expansion of franchising as a method of doing busi-
ness has inevitably led to an expansion of litigation involving disputes be-
tween parties to franchises. Statutory antitrust causes of action, as well as
novel applications of older common law theories, have been applied to
determine the rights and liabilities of the parties. Franchisees have banded
together in associations to advance their causes, both through litigation
and lobbying; the franchise industry, with 492,000 franchise businesses
and $298.5 billion in annual sales, certainly has a nation-wide impact.' 5
Imaginative applications of accepted legal theory, and novel arguments
for innovation in law, can make franchise litigation important to our eco-
nomic as well as our legal communities.
185. Wall St. J., Oct. 30, 1979, at 4, col. 1.
1980]
26
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 1 [1980], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol45/iss1/8
